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Abstract 
 
Reconstruction of Estonian banking system started twenty years ago. Estonia built 
up for the market economy a banking oriented financial sector, which is centred on 
commercial banks. During the two decades less than ten banks remained from 
more than 50 licensed commercial banks, the rest were not able to continue 
independently, they merged or have failed. The bad result of such kind of 
development was also the excessive concentration of banking. 
 
Banking sector in Estonia during the transition period was opened to the invasion 
of foreign banks due to the openness of the economy and excessive risks taken. 
Two banking crises, selected quickly the very limited number of prosperous banks, 
and the major commercial banks went into the ownership of Scandinavian banks. 
 
The qualitative effects of foreign banks’ entry into the Estonian banking market 
were new features of competition in banking market and transfer of various know-
how from foreign banks. Better liquidity risk management techniques, information 
systems, credit policy and personnel policy transfer from foreign banks supported 
banks to have high profitability and low credit losses rates. These directions are 
noticeable also by quantitative analyses of banking market development.  
 
The takeover of main commercial banks by the large Swedish and Finnish banks 
was one of important factors in the gradual increase of the social orientation of 
Estonian banks however the ideas of social responsibility of enterprises are 
especially popular in Scandinavia. In our paper we analyse also Estonian banks’ 
practices of supporting the social development of Estonia. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Reforms in Estonian banking sector started in 1988, three years before restoring 
the political independence in August 1991. 
 
In addition to the transition to market economy, Estonia had one more aim in 
reconstructing its banking system – to raise their financial independence, and the 
result was that Estonia became a pioneer in the reformation of banking system in 
former USSR. 
 
During the two decades five banks remained from more than 50 licensed 
commercial banks, the rest were not able to continue independently, they merged 
or have failed. The bad result of such kind of development was also the excessive 
concentration in banking sector. Market share of the biggest bank by assets is over 
50 per cent. 
 
The main roots of the first banking crisis in Estonia came from the deep crisis of 
the whole economy; poor banks risk management, changed financial environment 
after the currency reform and weak supervision from the side of the central bank. 
Reasons of the second banking crisis were pitfall in Tallinn Stock Exchange in 
autumn 1997 and financial crisis of Estonian important trade partner Russia in 
autumn 1998. The most notable similarity of both crises was that banks with poor 
risk management and control levels suffered in harder troubles and a remarkable 
share of the population either lost their savings in entirety or lost for the high 
inflation rate part of their savings purchasing value in domestic market. 
 
Banking sector in Estonia during the transition period was opened to the invasion 
of foreign banks due to the openness of the economy and excessive risks taken. 
Two banking crises, selected quickly the very limited number of prosperous banks, 
and after the second banking crisis the major commercial banks went into the 
ownership of Scandinavian banks. 
 
The qualitative effects of foreign banks’ entry into the Estonian banking market 
where intensification the overall competition in banking market and transfer of 
various know-how from foreign banks. Better liquidity risk management 
techniques, information systems, credit policy and personnel policy transfer from 
foreign banks was highly evaluated by the Estonian domestic banks. These 
directions are noticeable also by quantitative analyses of banking market 
development.  
 
The negative experiences of people and entrepreneurs with the financial sector 
force the financial institutions to make efforts to improve their reputation and 
trustworthiness. As the transition economies have difficulties with improving the    5
social sphere because of financial constraints, participation in social programs is 
useful in order to improve the reputation. Thus one can argue that foreign banks 
entry increased the social orientation in Estonian financial sector, and the 
supporting of social development is one of the ways to improve its low image. 
Such kind of spending some profits for being visible is useful not only to the 
society, but also to bank’s owners themselves. 
 
In our research we try to find answers to the two questions about the qualitative 
changes of banking business: are the foreign banks entering to the Estonian 
emerging banking market for they see in host country better profit opportunities 
and assists or not the social orientation of banks to earn bigger profits. 
  
2. Development stages of the banking sector in Estonia 
 
Introduction of the market economy in transition countries took place 
simultaneously with structural and legal reforms. Reforms of banking systems and 
the creation of workable financial markets are among the biggest institutional 
changes of these states. During the central-planning socialist economy, the banking 
sector was doing little more than allocating funds to the various sectors and 
companies, according to the authorities decisions (Stepic, 2002). 
 
Financial sector reforms for transition countries were not an easy task for high 
speed of changes and for effects of economic and financial crises in this period. 
Therefore the risk management experience of the staff of banks was short, they 
practically had not risk hedging funds and the banking regulations were in a 
forming stage. 
 
Reforms in Estonia banking sector started in 1988, three years before restoring the 
political independence in August 1991. 
 
The first period of development of new banking in Estonia can be named as a 
“wild” banking period and it ended with first banking crisis. Wild banking means 
that former soviet banking regulations were not in force, but central bank had not 
developed new ones. Crisis started in autumn 1992 and decreased the number of 
operating banks twice. The main roots of the first banking crisis in Estonia came 
from the deep crisis of the whole economy; poor banks risk management, changed 
financial environment after the currency reform and weak supervision from the 
side of the central bank. 
 
The second period can be called as a “naïve-optimistic” banking period and was 
interrupted by second banking crisis in 1998. This period began when economy 
after crisis started again to grow. It was noticed that in risk management banks did    6
not take into the account the cyclical development of economy, they did not protect 
them against the risk of economic slowdown. Reasons of the second banking crisis 
were pitfall in Tallinn Stock Exchange in autumn 1997 and financial crisis in 
Estonian important trade partner Russia in autumn 1998. The most notable 
similarity of both crises was that banks with poor risk management and control 
levels suffered in harder troubles and a remarkable share of the population either 
lost their savings in entirety or lost part of their savings purchasing power due to 
freezing deposits in period of high inflation. It led to the mergers of certain banks, 
coming of foreign banks into Estonia as the strategic investors for Estonian banks 
and the bankruptcy of three smaller banks. After the second banking crisis in 
Estonia operated only 5 banks and one branch office of a foreign bank and the 
market share of the biggest bank by assets was over 50%.  
 
The essential difference of the banking crisis in 1998–1999 from the previous one 
was the fact that the Swedish banks SE Banken and Swedbank were involved in 
saving the two major banks of Estonia, the Hansabank and the Union Bank of 
Estonia. Those banks had just merged with weaker banks and now their share in 
the banking market of Estonia was respectively. 50% and 30%. They had also been 
evaluated by international rating agencies. As they were not able to carry on their 
business independently any longer, the owners and managers had to look for 
strategic investors. The troubles had lowered the price of shares, so international 
banks found it the right time to come to help. The small banks of Estonia also 
looked desperately for partners, but as their market share was small and they did 
not own international ratings, they were not able to draw international interest. 
Empirical results from 15 emerging markets (Roldos, 2001:15) showed that each 
crisis of the banking system led to a further increase in participation and control by 
foreign banks in the domestic banking sector. During the crisis it is necessary to 
intervene to further capitalize banks or to sell unsuccessful banks. Foreign banks 
are the only ones with have resources to do so. 
 
The Bank of Estonia (BOE) did not allow before the currency reform in 1992 any 
foreign share in Estonian commercial banks. But the new regulations of the 
issuance of banking licences after the currency reform did not impose such 
restrictions. Therefore on 26 August 1992 Ameerika-Balti Ühispank (American 
Bank of the Baltics), whose sole proprietor was an USA businessman, received a 
licence as well as INKO Balti Pank (INKO Baltic Bank) on 29 September 1994, 
which was the subsidiary bank of the Ukrainian INKO Bank. But the Board of 
BOE did not approve all applications. For example, the representatives of the 
Austrian Doonau Bank had to return bare-handed. In September 1994 Merita Bank 
established a branch in Tallinn. As the first two banks, created on the basis of 
foreign capital, did not find their place in Estonia and had lost their licences by 
now, then the branch of Merita-Nordbanken (now Nordea) after a long period of    7
quiet growth has began to apply an expansion strategy and wishes to increase its 
market share in Estonia. 
 
In spite of some unsuccessful foreign banks the “open doors” policy of BOE was 
undoubtedly a right strategy, because the positive aspects of the coming of foreign 
banks balance up the possible negative ones. Arguments, why foreign owned banks 
can exploit efficiency gains are given in Appendix 1. The policy of the central 
bank of India, that allows only 20% of foreign capital shares in an Indian bank, is a 
warning example. The Economist stated in its January copy this year that one of 
the main reasons for the poor situation in Indian banking is untrustworthiness to 
foreign banks (India’s ..., 2001). 
 
Experts are on the opinion that in transition countries it is necessary to allow the 
foreign capital to enter the banking sector. For example, the research of Eller et al. 
(2006) about impact of financial sector FDI on economic growth in 11 Central and 
Eastern European countries from 1996 to 2003 find a hump-shaped impact of 
financial sector FDI on economic growth. 
 
The  European banks have always been waiting for a suitable moment to come into 
Estonia. Schleswig-Holsten Landesbank, based on the German capital, started a bit 
too early and met in autumn 1997 the resistance of the management of Eesti 
Investeerimispank to the wish to acquire 60% of the shares of the Estonian bank. 
The resistance was justified by the necessity to continue the activities as an 
investment bank and not to turn to a retail bank. But this idea was not realized. In 
June 2000 Optiva Pank, which was established by the merger of Eesti 
Investeerimispank and Forekspank, and had received financial injections from the 
central bank, was acquired in favourable conditions by Sampo Finance Ltd, a joint 
company owned by the Finnish banking and insurance company Sampo-Leonia 
and the Estonian Kaleva Mutual Insurance Company. The new owners turned 
Optiva Pank to Sampo Pank that offers both insurance and banking retail services.  
 
The foreign banks got an opportunity to acquire shares in Estonian banks because 
the local banks turned to quoted companies. Hansapank was the first one to reach 
the foreign stock exchanges in 1994. The banks also faced a need to raise foreign 
capital in connection with the schedule of the growth of share capital and equity 
capital prescribed by the central bank. By the end of 1995 foreigners (foreign 
banks ownership formed 29.2% and 5.7% were the clients of foreign banks) held 
35% of the share capital of Estonian banks. 
 
The Swedish major banks (Swedbank and SEB) managed to wait their time. They 
bought from the stock exchange the cheapened shares of the Estonian major banks 
and in 1998 they were able to acquire without resistance an essential share of the    8
share capital of Hansapank and Eesti Ühispank that were facing financial 
difficulties. Last news were that Sweden’s SEB Group had signed an agreement to 
acquire 97,25% of Factorial Bank in Ukraine. Following completion of the deal, 
which is subject to regulatory approval the bank will be merged with and rebanded 
as SEB’s existing subsidiary, SEB Bank Ukraine (ex-Bank Agio) (European banks 
…, 2007). 
 
The question why the Nordic banks are especially active in the Baltics has its own 
logic. The Baltic region is geographically ideal for Nordic banks in their expansion 
spree. Decisive action can be observed in Estonia, which banking sector is the most 
advanced Baltic State as far as the banking sector is concerned (Tiusanen & 
Jumpponen, 2000). 
 
Banking research in Lithuania and Romania also showed that the main reason for 
foreign banks’ entry into Lithuanian and Romanian banking market has been 
realization their strategy of searching for new business opportunities (Dubauskas, 
2002; Florescu, 2002). 
 
By the end of 1998, the share capital of Eesti Ühispank and Hansapank were on the 
hands of foreign credit institutions respectively 68.4% and 64.9% and the foreign 
share in the share capital of Estonian banks had increased to 55.8%. By the end of 
2006, already 94.4% of the shares of Estonian commercial banks were in the 
ownership of non-residents (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Shareholders structure of Estonian commercial banks  
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* October 1th 1997 
Source: Data of Bank of Estonia. 
Foreign capital 
Domestic capital  9
Foreign banks came to other transition countries the same way as to Estonia – 
when the local banks were in difficulties. For example, the analysis of the Croatian 
banking proves that during the period of the third banking crises (1999–2000) the 
share of private capital in the banking sector increased to 90%, most of it was a 
foreign share (Barisitz, 2000). 
 
At the end of 1996 there was made a survey of the main banks, which had invested 
in CEE countries (Konopielko, 1999). The survey showed that the main motivation 
for entry in CEE banking market according to factor’s level of importance (1 – not 
important at all; 2 – not important; 3 – important; 4 – very important) was the 
following: the first rank got supporting client base (3.46 points) and the second was 
looking for new business opportunities (3.32 points) (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Prevailing elements of entry strategies* and country characteristics 
 Poland  Czech  Republic  Hungary 
Reason for entry  Follow client  Follow client  Search for new 
opportunities 
Method Subsidiary  Branch  Take-over 






Branching Underbranched  Overbranched  Overbranched 
Profit growth 




3.12 years  3 years  2,5 years 
*   Table lists highest rated or dominant answers for each question in the survey. 
**   Period of investment return is given as an average of answers. 
Source: Konopielko, 1999. 
 
The mentioned survey showed that the entry strategies were different for different 
transition countries. Table 1 shows that in the Czech Republic and in Poland the 
preferred entry strategies were similar. For the Hungarian banking sector, as the 
most mature, it is necessary to adopt a more aggressive strategy, characterized by 
the willingness to search for new business as well as an expectation of a relatively 
short period of investment return. 
 
Several analyses have showed that the relationship between trade and FDI is strong 
and positive (Carlin and Landesman, 1997; Kaminski, 2000; Jensen, 2004/2005). 
From Figure 2 (see also Appendix 2) we see that Estonian export of goods grew 
during last nine years near four times and export of services more than three times. 
So we may conclude that Estonian case showed also a very strong positive   10
influence of FDI inflow to the banking sector to the export activity of Estonian 
companies. 
 


















Export of goods Export of services
Export of goods 31.8 37.8 37.0 56.1 58.8 57.9 63.4 75.2 98.0 120.2
Export of services 18.4 20.8 22.0 25.3 28.1 28.2 30.7 36.7 40.2 43.4
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 
Source: Balance of Payments Yearbook 2003, 2004; Estonian Balance of 
Payments Yearbook 2006, 2007; compiled by the authors. 
 
Most of Estonian banks had quite ambitious growth strategies. Growth was 
achieved by introducing new ideas, by cheaper service or by cheaply acquiring 
competitors during banking crises. Already the researchers analysing the Finnish 
banking crisis at the beginning of 1990es discovered the fact that a banking sector 
that grows faster than the overall economy will in the long run end up in a banking 
crisis (Koskenkyla, 1995). The economists analysing the Japanese banking crisis 
came up with two reasons for this: deregulation and excess power of the banking 
sector. These were the reasons why they did not pay very much attention on risk 
management and regulative measures (Kanaya and Woo, 2001). Apparently, this 
was also the case in Estonia: rapid growth in several years led to excess capacity of 
banking and also to underestimation of risk management in 1997. The banking 
crisis in 1998 brought the banking back to the ground from the clouds (Table 2), 
when number of operating banks decreased twice and sector was in losses. 
 
After the banking crisis in 1998 started the modern banking period. Modern period 
means that Estonian bank managements had two crisis experiences and got know-
how from Scandinavian parent banks. Joining the EU in 2004 even accelerated   11
growth of the loan portfolio, which was in 2006 near twice bigger than in 2004. It 
was a good basis for growth profits of the banks. During three last year profits of 
the banks near tripled. 
   
Table 2. Development of banking in Estonia 
Totally by the end of the year,  
bill EEK (€ 1 = EEK 15,6)  Year 
Number of  
operating 
banks*  assets  loan 







per bank  
(bill EEK)  
1992 41  5.2 2.1 0.09 36.4 0.05 
1993 22  6.4 2.7 0.25 28.0 0.12 
1994 24  10.4 4.5 0.04 33.2 0.19 
1995 18  15.5 7.1 0.29 36.0 0.39 
1996 13  22.9 12.3 0.51 41.0 0.95 
1997 11  40.6 21.3 0.96 59.2 1.99 
1998 6  41.0 23.9 –0.50 52.6 3.98 
1999 7  47.1 26.7 0.67 57.6 3.81 
2000 7  57.8 34.3 0.61 60.5 4.90 
2001 7  68.4 40.7 1.68 63.2 5.82 
2002 7  81.7 50.0 1.15 67.3 7.14 
2003 7  98.8 69.2 1.32 72.6 9.89 
2004 9  133.6 92.6 2.46 94.2 10.29 
2005 13  185.1 125.5 3.11 105.5 9.66 
2006 14  239.5 177.7 3.63 115.6 12.70 
* incl. branches of foreign banks 
Source: Eesti Pank. 
 
We agree with opinion of ECB that the rapid growth of credit to the private sector 
observed in a number of countries in the region could pose risk to both 
macroeconomic and financial stability. Macroeconomic risks relate, in particular, 
to an overheating economy and an associated worsening of the current account. 
(ECB Monthly Bulletin, 2006). And really in Estonia current account deficit was 
over 15% in 2006 comparing with GDP and GDP growth was 11,4%. 
 
Probably loan portfolio extremely quick growth has increased the banking sector 
crisis risk in Estonia. Loan portfolio of banks grew in Estonia to the end of 2005 
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3. Development of profitability of Estonian banks after entry of foreign capital 
 
While reconstructing their banking systems to adjust them to a market economy, 
some transition countries like Estonia have preferred commercial banking. The 
main purpose of commercial banks’ shareholders and executive management is to 
increase the value of the company, which requires both a quick rise in the capacity 
of financial services and a high level of profitability of the business activities. 
 
The managements of banks must therefore ensure high profitability of banks in 
order for their banks to remain competitive despite any unforeseeable 
developments in the market. Thus, they eagerly grasp at any profit opportunities.  
 
Researches have shown that efficient banking sector accelerate economic growth in 
a transition country (e. g. Levine 1997, Wachtel 2001, Koivu 2002). Estonian ex-
periences have shown the same. 
 
In spite of the large amount of empirical literature devoted to banking efficiency on 
all continents (Molyneux et al., 1996; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Dietsch and 
Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Goddart et al., 2001), there are only a few studies that 
measure banking efficiency in transition economies. A likely reason for this deficit 
may be the relative lack of banking data in these countries, with long periods of 
data missing. 
 
The most extensively studied developing countries are in Asia, where markets of 
Thailand (Leightner and Knox Lovell, 1998), Korea (Gilbert and Wilson, 1998), 
Singapore (Rezvanian and Mehdian, 2002), Pakistan (Hardy and Bonaccorsi di 
Patti, 2001), India (Bhattacharyya et al., 1997), Turkey (Isik and Hassan, 2002) 
were analyzed. Some studies investigates a number of countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (Grigorian and 
Manole, 2002; Tomova et al., 2003; Uiboupin, 2005), Hungary (Hasan and 
Marton, 2003), Croatia (Kraft and Tirtiroglu, 1998), Poland (Opiela, 2001; 
Havrylchyk, 2003), and Ukraine (Mertens and Urga, 2001) and Baltics (Hansson 
and Tombak, 1996) were studied. After 1998, the profits in Estonian banking 
sector have stabilized (Table 3). In 2006 in euro area banks average cost-income 
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Table 3. Key efficiency ratios in Estonian banking (%) 
Solo banks 
 
2000 2002 2004 2006 
Euro area financial 
institutions average 
2006 
Cost to income ratio  72,5 61,6 45,8 46,6 60.51 
Return on assets   1,2 1,6 2,1 1,7 1.48 
Equity multipler  7,4 7,3 8,8 10,7 11.4 
Return on equity  8,0 14,7 20,0 19,8 18.75 
Net interest income/assets  4,3 3,6 2,4 2,2 0.95 
Source: Eesti Pank. Financial Stability Review;  
ECB Financial Stability Review, 2007. 
 
Researches have shown that the increase in the degree of concentration in the 
European banking sector is negatively related to competition (Bikker and 
Groenveld, 2000). Lower competition is linked to higher profitability. As banking 
concentration in Estonia is very high (see Figure 3) it is helping bigger banks to 
increase their profits and profitability. For example Hansabank declares to the 
press that in year 2007 its loan portfolio grew approximately 50% and is forming 
near 20% share of Swedbanks portfolio, but share of profit of Hansabank is ca 40% 
of Swedbanks result (Tänavsuu, 2007). 
 
Figure 3.  Market Shares of Banks in Estonia According to Total Assets  
at the End of 2006 (end of 2000 in brackets) 
Hansapank 53.2% 
(56.8%)
SEB Eesti Ühispank 
24.4% (26.7%)
Eesti Krediidipank 
1.5%(1.4%) Other 9.9% (7.5%) Sampo Pank 9.8% 
(7.6% )
 
Source: Eesti Pank; authors’ calculations. 
 
Banks’ profit growth has also been supported by the continuous expansion of loan 
portfolio and the rise in key interest rates. As most of the loans in Estonia have 
been granted with a floating interest rate, banks’ interest income on interest-
earning assets has increased by 1 percentage point, year-on-year, to 4.9% on an   14
aggregate basis. The interest paid on interest-bearing liabilities has increased by 
only 0.7 percentage points to 2.7%. The impact of the changes in key interest rates, 
however, has been reduced by the decreased share of deposits (as it is a cheaper 
resource than external financing) in banks’ funding. 
 
Besides the enhances incomes the profitability of the banking sector has also been 
fostered by the so far relatively low risk costs. Although the share and volume of 
the net write-downs of claims has continued to increase, banks’ total net write-
downs of claims did not exceed 0.1% of assets as an annual average. In case of 
banking groups the share of write-downs is somewhat higher (0.26%) (Eesti Pank. 
Financial Stability Review, May 2007). 
 
As regards the future profitability of banks, the further rise in key interest rates 
would probably facilitate the continuing growth of the net interest margin. 
However, this would occur at a slower pace, should the growth of loan portfolios 
still exceed that of deposits. In that case, the share of the more expensive external 
funds in banks’ liabilities would increase. 
 
One way to increase the profit capacity is to establish and overtook financial 
institutions which offer nonbanking services. From Table 4 we see that in year 
2006 in Estonian banks groups profit was bigger than in solo banks (except Sampo 
Bank). 
 
Table 4. Estonian banks profits before taxes in 2006 (mln. EEK) 
Banks Solo  banks  Bank  group  Share of solo 
bank % 
Eesti Krediidipank  75,7 80,3 94,3 
SEB Eesti Ühispank  913,0 1389,6 65,7 
Hansapank 2012,4 5527,3 36,4 
Sampo Pank  337,0 333,0 101,2 
Tallinna Äripanga AS  35,2 57,8 60,9 
BIG 155,5 178,4 87,2 
SBM 3,5 3,5 100,0 
 
Table 4 we may also see that our biggest bank Hansapank earned two third of 
profits outside of banking services. The second biggest bank SEB Eesti Ühispank 
earned one third of profits from additional financial services. Last published data 
from the year 2003 are showing that banks ownership in other financial 
intermediaries was in leasing sector 99,2%, in life insurance 68,3%, in investment 
funds 90,3% and in pension funds 87,8% (Eesti Pank Annual Report 2003, 2004). 
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4. Improvement of social orientation of Estonian banks 
 
Reconstructing Estonian banking sector began in 1988, when the first commercial 
banks were founded. The development of the banking sector during near the past 
20 years has been stormy and has undergone crises in which a remarkable share of 
the population either lost their savings in their entirety or lost part of their savings 
exchange value.  
 
Such developments have after the crisis period made the population suspicious of 
the banking sector. The research which was ordered by Eesti Pank in November 
2008 ahowed that one quarter of respondents are doubtful about creditability of 
banking sector in Estonia even now (Estonian residents opinion …, 2007). This is 
indicated by the large share of demand deposits of banks’ deposits in Estonia. 
From Figure 4 we see that credibility of banks started to decrease during the 
second banking crisis in years 1998–1999 when the share of demand deposits grew 
and stabilized on the level a bit higher of 60%. Surely demand deposits share it is 
too high taking into account Estonian stable economic policy and development. 
 
Extremely high share of demand deposits has also second reason. Near every adult 
citizen in Estonia has the banking account and gets his or her every month incomes 
this account. But more than half of bank account holders are not able to save. It 
may be notised also from the average sum of the deposits, which was at the end of 
2006 approximately 36,2 thousand kroons and of individuals only 15,2 thousands 
(€ 1000) (Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Average deposits by groups of customers  
(end of the year, EEK thousands) 
  2004 2005 2006 
Average deposit  22.1 30.0  35.2 
Average deposit attracted from general 
government  308.0 492.9 796.1 
financial institutions  1,996.5 1,671.4  1,993.1 
commercial undertakings  163.8 246.3  277.3 
individuals 10.7 13.0  15.3 
Source: http://www.eestipank.info 
 
Denizer and Wolf (2000) suggest that savings increased, in the ex-communist 
countries, after the fall of the communist regime, whish is explainable, taking into 
account three mechanisms: 
•  The state got less involved in financing public services, which made 
people resort to savings for paying their access to health services, 
educational services, legal services, etc.   16
•  During the communist regime, a greater than usual amount of cash in 
hand (in home) was necessary for the rapid purchase of consumption 
good which might have appeared in town over night (for instance, a 
superior quality blanket, or a chandelier). Afterwards, the free 
distribution of these goods made superfluous the amount of cash 
retained for “surprise” buying. 
•  Finally, the elimination of involuntary savings (like mutual help funds, 
or the lists for buying a car) allowed more rational individual and/or 
family saving plans to emerge. 
This would count as an indicator of transition progress in developing countries, as 








Figure 4. Structure of Deposits of Individuals in Commercial Banks 



























































Source: Eesti Pank, authors’ calculations. 
 
The negative experiences of people and entrepreneurs with the banking sector 
forced commercial banks to make efforts to improve their reputation and 
trustworthiness. As the transition countries have difficulties with improving the 
social sphere because of financial constraints, participation in social programs is   17
useful in order to improve the reputation. For example, social protection 
expenditure in Estonia amounted to 16–17% of GDP in 1995–1999, and in 2000 
and 2001, it decreased to 15.6% and 14.8% of GDP, respectively. Social protection 
expenditure in the EU countries on the average accounted for 27.3% of GDP in 
2000, ranging from 14.1% in Ireland to 32.3% in Sweden (Püss and Viies 2003, p. 
257). Corrected data of 2001 show that in 2001 social expenditure in Estonia 
amounted only 13,1% of GDP (Estonian Human Development Report 2006 2007, 
p. 112). 
 
Thus one can argue that for the Estonian commercial banks, supporting social 
development is one of the ways to improve its low image. One example, SEB Eesti 
Ühispank is the first in Estonia to offer its customers a possibility personally to 
design the picture of their credit cards. The bank has developed a simple and 
convenient photo-shop environment on the Internet for printing one’s picture on 
the credit card (visit the website at www.seb.ee/pildikaart). Such spending, we 
might add, profits from being visible, not only to others, but also to themselves. Of 
cause, the SEB Eesti Ühispank picture bank card costs for customer more than 
ordinary card. 
All market participants must go along with this, in order not to lose clients to 
competitors in an extremely concentrated market. As can be seen from Figure 3, 
the market share of two largest commercial banks in Estonia was 77,6% by the end 
of the year 2006, whereas had given up some of their market share to smaller  
market participants. 
 
Here Estonia is not an exception. In research of a highly concentrated banking 
sector in the Netherlands retail banks aim is to distinguish themselves from their 
competition by maintaining or creating a different image. Through this diverging 
behaviour they try to attract different market and/or customer segments (Boonstra 
and Groenveld, 2006). 
 
Two concentration ratios are usually used: the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HH) 
and the market share of the top five banks. In Estonia these indexes are highest in 
EU. In the Table 6 we see that these indexes in EU are rising but Estonian indexes 
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Table 6. Indicators of banking concentration in Europe 
  G5 (2001) % G5 (2004) %  HH (2001) HH (2004) 
Belgium 78.3 84.3 1587 2100 
Czech Republic  68.4 64.0 1263 1103 
Denmark 67.6 67.0 1119 1146 
Estonia   98.9 98.6 4067 3887 
Finland 79.5 82.7 2240 2680 
France 47.0 44.7 606 623 
Germany 20.2 22.1 158 178 
Hungary 56.4 52.7 892 795 
Italy 28.8 26.0 260 230 
Lithuania 87.6 78.9 2503 1854 
Malta 79.6 78.7 2163 2015 
Netherlands   82.5 84.0 1762 1726 
Poland 54.7 50.2 821 692 
UK 28.6 34.5 282 347 
EU–25 average  37.8 40.2 506 569 
Source: The New Banking in Economics, 2007:122. 
 
It is necessary to distinguish between moral, political, and legal responsibility. 
Moral responsibility may be related only to consciousness; its extreme expression 
is Dostoevski’s statement: “Everybody is guilty of everything” (Responsibility 
1972). 
 
The takeover of the two largest commercial banks (Hansapank and Eesti Ühispank) 
by the large Swedish banks, Swedbank and SEB, has surely been a factor in the 
gradual increase of social orientation of Estonian banks. The ideas of social 
responsibility are known to be especially popular in Sweden, certainly affecting 
also the banks’ policies. After the takeover of Hansapank and Eesti Ühispank, 
representatives of the Swedish side were appointed to their councils and directives 
were issued from Sweden on the need to pay more attention to supporting the 
social development.  
 
In the new Millennium while other countries fell into a period of stagnation 
Scandinavia showed robust growth, moved up into the leading group of innovative 
counties, maintained its welfare state (Becker, 2007). He sees, that one of 
cornerstones of it is the comparatively low social inequality and poverty and the 
corporatism, which makes it possible to coordinate economic and social objectives. 
 
The banks that own the third and fourth largest commercial banks in Estonia 
(Nordea Pank, Sampo Pank) are of Finnish origin. In Finland, like in Sweden, the 
emphasis on social development is especially strong. This explains well why   19
Nordea Pank and Sampo Pank are unwilling to lag behind the leaders with their 
social programs.  
 
To achieve the rapid growth of assets, it is necessary to ensure that the number of 
clients as well as their financial assets in the bank increase. To win new clients 
from competing banks is neither easy nor cheap, however. Thus, the appropriate 
method to get more clients is to look for new ones by offering various benefits and 
investment opportunities.  
 
One method to get new clients and tie them strongly to the bank is to grant student 
loans. The conditions for this type of loan are the most favourable ones offered by 
Estonian banks. The maximum annual amount of the government-guaranteed loan 
is 25,000 kroons (ca € 1280) and the fixed interest rate is 5%. This is granted for 
the whole period of post-secondary education, with either two sureties or with real 
estate as collateral. Because government-guaranteed loans are not granted to 
distant education and self-financed students, banks have on their own initiative and 
risks started to grant student loans for them, too. To the end of 2006 student loans 
formed in Estonia totally EEK 3,2 bil., and they grew 73,5% comparing with 2000. 
 
In addition to finding new clients, an important component of growth strategies of 
financial institutions is also offering the products that could attract the clients to 
save more. This is an explanation for why the share of banks in other financial 
intermediaries was so high.  
 
By now, banks have lowered the interest rate paid on demand deposits to 0.20–
0.25% per year. Also some periods their interest rates of the time deposits were 
below the inflation rate. Because the main motive for saving is precautionary 
motive in Estonia (see also Figure 4), banks are not afraid of outflow of deposits. 
Growth of deposits, however, is ensured only by the addition of new motives for 
saving. Such motives can be e.g. financially insuring of the future against accidents 
or old age. It is therefore not surprising that in addition to ordinary investment 
opportunities, banks offer also pension insurance in the form of either an insurance 
certificate or an insurance fund. The latter kind is especially beneficial for the 
banks, as it ensures them stable, very long-term risk-free resource for financial 
investments. Because payments from the pension funds to future pensioners will be 
paid out not on the basis of the sum actually paid, but its present value, the fund 
can use the money without risk, because the possible loss and costs of 
administering the fund reduce the amount paid out as pensions.  
 
The above analysis shows that the Estonian financial sector has several motives for 
supporting social development, which ultimately can be reduced to the intention to 
improve their image and facilitate the growth of profits.  
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As the Estonian financial sector is centred around banks, the Estonian commercial 
banks naturally also have a central role in supporting the socio-economic 
development. They do so by offering novel saving schemes, various benefits for 
the less-insured client groups, and sponsorship. The costs of running and 
advertising such programmes are remarkable. For example, according to the annual 
report of Sampo Pank for 2005, its consolidated group communication and data 
processing expenses were EEK 52,5 mln., and advertising expenses EEK 23,9 mln. 
That the amounts are significant can be seen from comparison with their 2005 year 
profits, which was EEK 172.2 million (AS Sampo Pank … 2006, p. 11).  
 
The most significant part of social responsibility of the financial sector seems to be 
the participation of banks in the introduction of Estonian three-pillar pension 
system. Discussion of the pension reform in Estonia started already at the 
beginning of the 90s, as it was clear that in the future, government pension could 
not ensure the sufficient standard of living for most pensioners. The rise in the 
overall dependency ratio is mainly due to rise in the old age dependency ratio 
(defined as the ratio of those people older than 64 to those of working age), which 
is projected to continue to increase from the current level of about 26% to a level 
close to 55% by 2050 (ECB 2006, p. 50). Thus, on September 12, 2001, Estonia 
approved the Funded Pensions Act, which became the basis for the three-pillar 
pension system. Share of old age population on Estonia is twice higher than in the 
world (Table 7). 
 
Table 7. Share of more than 65 years in population and place  
in the world in 2005 
Country  Place among world 
countries 
More than 65 years old 
people share (%) 
Japan 1  20 
Italy 2  19 
Germany 3  18 
Belgium 7  17 
Spane 8  17 
EU–25 12  16 
France 12  16 
England 17  16 
Estonia 17  16 
Denmark 26  15 
Netherlands 33 14 
Russia 34  13 
USA 44  12 
World 91  7 
Source: Pison, 2006.   21
 
The theoretical framework of the three pillars is adopted internationally mainly in 
order to enable convenient description and international comparisons of pension 
systems. The first pillar (Pillar I, national pension) is financed according to the 
principle of pay-as-you-go, i.e. payments to people at the pension age are financed 
from taxes of the working generation. Pillar II is a pre-funded private capital-based 
mandatory pension. Pillar III is voluntary pre-funded pension, which is meant 
mainly for people who wish for the future a standard of living higher than that 
offered by the state. The third pillar of the pension system is like an agreement 
between people and the state that if the person takes care of her own future, the 
state demands less in taxes from him or her. So far, almost all responsibility for the 
pensions has been borne by the state, whereas now, people themselves have to 
assume part of it.  
 
Administration of state-supported mandatory pension funds is a profitable 
business. Because of the favourable opportunity for business, six Estonian financial 
institutions are fighting for a good position in the pension market – Hansapank, 
Eesti Ühispank, Seesam, Sampo Pank, LHV and ERGO, who have altogether 
brought to market 16 pension funds. Because administration fees of pension funds 
will be a stable source of income, the pre-funded pensions are important for the 
fund manager.  
 
Business newspaper Äripäev calculated that when 25 years old worker will join the 
pension system II Pillar and when his salary is 10 000 kroons per month, then he 
will pay to the foundation until his pension age 978 510 kroons from which 30–
40% will get foundation in form of servicing fees (Tuul, 2007). Already started 
discussion that it is necessary to cut fees rates because Estonian fees are the highest 
in Europe. For example, funds servicing fees in Estonia are from 1/3 to 2/3 over 
average levels in Europe says Estonian Financial Supervision Authority (Linnamäe 
and Uusen, 2007). 
 
Voluntary pension insurance (Pillar III) is offered by five Estonian life insurance 
companies and four voluntary pension funds are also growing. Most of the market 
participants have several different products – there are altogether some twenty 
possibilities to choose from.  
 
Pillar II of the pension system was launched in May 2002 in Estonia. Advertising 
campaigns by banks and insurance companies brought more than 200 thousand 
entrants (for those older than 18 years, joining was not mandatory), which 
exceeded even the most optimistic forecasts. In one year, the Pillar II funds had 
accumulated EEK 530.5 million. Investments into the supplementary funded 
pension (III pillar) funds reached a record last year, with the volume of funds 
increasing from MEEK 343 to BEEK 1.1 in the year. In addition to the growth of   22
funds, the number of the clients of supplementary funded pension increased from 
the 25 107 at the end of 2006 to more than 42 000 investors at the end of 2007. By 
funds, Hansa Pension Fund V3 has the most clients for a supplementary funded 
pension. The number of clients joining the Hansa Pension Fund V3 has doubled 
every year. If at the end of 2006, Hansa Pension Fund V3 had 11 000 unit holders, 
then by the end of 2007, the number had increased to 21 000. In terms of the 
number of unit holders, the Pension Fund Active of SEB Ühispank is second 
(8 363 unit holders) (Press release of ECSD, 2008). 
 
Pillar III funds, although they were launched already in 2001, have accumulated 
less resources however they only involve people with higher than average incomes. 
The number of people who joined the mandatory funded pension (II pillar) 
increased from 519 726 people to 554 3534 in 2007. The total volume of the funds 
of mandatory funded pension increased from BEEK 7.5 to BEEK 11 last year. The 
EPI index, which reflects the average rate of return of funded pension funds, 
increased by 5.6% in 2007 – from 145.67 points to 154.32 points. 
 
At the turn of the year, the persons who had expressed a wish to collect their 
mandatory funded pension into a new fund were able to do so and transfer the 
funds collected so far into the new fund as well. Last year, 42  902 investors 
directed their deposits into a new fund (35  129 in 2006) and 13  000 investors 
exchanged units (8 152 in 2006). Hansa Pension Fund K3 was the most popular 
among people changing their pension fund (Press release of ECSD, 2008). 
If compared with an average household, then the welfare level of older people and 
big families has shown a declining trend. The government has identified the 
increasing inequality as a serious problem and has, thus, granted several benefits 
for the groups in the risk of poverty. Child benefit as well as benefits in the form of 
free public transport for both minors and pensioners could serve here as an 
example. The banks have an incentive to provide similar kind of benefits in order 
to promote their reputation, and they do so, quite often. For example a small bank 
Eesti Krediidipank (look Figure 3) in his Annual Report writes: for several years 
(from 1996) Krediidipank has focused its attention on expanding the opportunities 
for supporting families with many children, and making society aware of the 
problems related to big families and the Estonian demographic situation. For 
Krediidipank, this is an opportunity to take social responsibility for the society’s 
less well-off members (Krediidipank 2007, p. 15). 
 
Banks have introduced the clients’ loyalty programs like other servicing sectors 
(see Appendix 4). In the view of Kumar and Reinartz (2005) loyalty programs can 
be divided into four major categories: building real loyalty, modification of 
purchase behaviour, learning and development, and adjusting the exchange value. 
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Most of the banks have set lower prices for transactions made by senior and junior 
clients. The price list for private customers of SEB Eesti Ühispank is brought in 
Table 8. Some benefits are also applied to the customers in the student age (18–
25). The price list for seniors applies to the customers who are at least 60 years old. 
In addition, lower fees are applied to the older and handicapped people in opening 
privatization voucher accounts and to the young people in formalizing housing 
loans.   
 
Table 8.  Prices of more important bank services of SEB Eesti Ühispank by client 
groups as of December 1, 2007 (in kroons) 





















Cash transactions fees  
(over the counter)  12 12 12 12 6 
Transactions via 



























monthly fee  15 free of 
charge 15 10 10 
VISA Elektron 










The benefits offered by the banks and other financial institutions to the young and 
older people have, along with humanitarian goals, a more pragmatic benefit for the 
banks as well. These clients make transactions very rarely and higher transaction 
fees would probably scare them away and, thus, support more intensive using of 
cash. This, in turn, means the withdrawal of deposits form the banks. 
 
The benefits for juniors seem to be even higher than for older people. This may be 
due to the fact that the bank is afraid to loose a potential life-long client. The 
saving and intensity of transactions of older people is, however, expected to 
decline and thus the attention is drawn more towards younger people.  
 
The banks are, in addition to the benefits, involved in providing direct sponsorship. 
This makes them visible and respectable. The homepage of Hansapank lists the   24
sponsoring principles, which state that “Hansapank is a company that due to its 
size feels certain responsibility for the society. Our coal is to support Estonia’s 
development” (http://www.hansa.ee). Appendix 3 includes the sponsoring 
principles of Hansapank. Main fields sponsored by Hansapank are education, 
culture and sports.  
 
The goals and principles of education sponsoring by Hansapank are brought here 
as an example: 
 
Human resources, an educated population and new ideas are key words that we 
emphasise in speaking of Estonia’s opportunities to stand out among other 
developed countries. As the rest of society, educated people are also the most 
valuable resource for Hansapank, as an employer. 
 
It is for that reason that we think of the future and support youth with various 
stipends, the provision of favourable student loans, education loans or master’s 
loans and the organisation of conferences. 
 
Since 1999 we issue, in co-operation with Tallinn Technical University, annual 
stipends to support masters and doctoral studies at the university. As of 2000, we 
will also support the ten most successful students at the Estonian Information 
Technology College with annual stipend bearing the Hansapank name. 
 
They have also made a contribution through the publishing of economics-related 
high school textbooks and workbooks, which will appear through the Junior 
Achievement Fund. 
 
Other banks and financial institutions have followed the example of Estonian 
leading bank by trying to be on the list of sponsors of popular cultural events, as 
well as by supporting the fields like education and health that are acknowledged as 
the priorities in the society. For example SEB Eesti Ühispank has issued the 
Bascetball card for basketball is very popular in Estonia. The Bascetball card with 
benefits for a sports fan was prepared in co-operation with SEB Eesti Ühispank 
and the Basketball Association. Besides the traditional debit card functions, the 
card provides several sports-related benefits. A card application may be sent to the 




Reconstructing Estonian banking sector began in 1988, when the first commercial 
banks were founded. The development of the banking sector during the past near 
twenty years has been stormy and has undergone crises in which a remarkable 
share of the population either lost their savings in their entirety or lost part of their   25
savings exchange value. Such developments have after the crisis period made the 
population suspicious of the banking sector. 
 
The negative experiences of people and entrepreneurs with the banking sector 
forced commercial banks to make efforts to improve their reputation and 
trustworthiness. As the transition countries have difficulties with improving the 
social sphere because of financial constraints, participation in social programs is 
useful in order to improve the reputation. 
 
Thus one can argue that for the Estonian commercial banks, supporting social 
development is one of the ways to improve its low image. Such spending, we 
might add, profits from being visible, not only to others, but also to themselves. 
 
The takeover of the two largest commercial banks (Hansapank and Eesti Ühispank) 
by the large Swedish banks, Swedbank and SEB, has surely been a factor in the 
gradual increase of social orientation of Estonian banks. The ideas of social 
responsibility are known to be especially popular in Sweden, certainly affecting 
also the banks’ policies. After the takeover of Hansapank and SEB Eesti Ühispank, 
representatives of the Swedish side were appointed to their councils and directives 
were issued from Sweden on the need to pay more attention to supporting the 
social development.  
 
Estonian commercial banks are the main owners of leasing and life insurance 
companies and investment funds. Such control of commercial banks over the 
Estonian financial sector means that the social orientation of banks will be carried 
over to their subsidiary financial institutions and the securities exchange, forming 
their policy.  
 
One method to get new clients and tie them strongly to the bank is to grant student 
loans. The conditions for this type of loan are the most favourable ones offered by 
Estonian banks. 
 
The most significant part of social responsibility of the financial sector seems to be 
the participation of banks in the introduction of Estonian three-pillar pension 
system. Discussion of the pension reform in Estonia started already at the 
beginning of the 90s, as it was clear that in the future, government pension could 
not ensure the sufficient standard of living for most pensioners. 
 
Administration of state-supported mandatory pension funds is a profitable 
business. Because of the favourable opportunity for business, six Estonian financial 
institutions are fighting for a good position in the pension market – Hansapank, 
Eesti Ühispank, Seesam, Sampo Pank, LHV and ERGO, who have altogether 
brought to market 15 pension funds. 
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Most of the banks have set lower prices for transactions made by senior and junior 
clients. The benefits offered by the banks and other financial institutions to the 
young and older people have, along with humanitarian goals, a more pragmatic 
benefit for the banks as well. These clients make transactions very rarely and 
higher transaction fees would probably scare them away and, thus, support more 
intensive using of cash. This, in turn, means the withdrawal of deposits form the 
banks. 
 
The banks are, in addition to the benefits, involved in providing direct sponsorship. 
This makes them visible and respectable. 
 
Other smaller banks and financial institutions have followed the example of 
Estonian leading banks by trying to be on the list of sponsors of popular cultural 
events, as well as by supporting the fields like education and health that are 
acknowledged as the priorities in the society. 
 
Professor Hans Blommestein found that society expects that banks take on 
increased gatekeeper responsibilities in the new business landscape. This mean that 
banks are expected to play a central and active gatekeeper’s role to monitor the 
behaviour of their clients and other counter-parties (Blommestein, 2006). Our 
research showed that Estonian banks very well understand their new role and 
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 of GDP 
•  strategic 
reorientation 
•  implementation of 
internal group 
standards 
•  clearing of risky 
credit portfolios 
(bad loans) 
•  FS developemnt 




•  technology changes
•  better risk 
management 
•  efficiency gains in 
the whole FS 
•  Increasing FS 
competition 
•  higher FS 
productivity 
•  lower operational 
costs 
•  increasing cost and 
profit efficiency 
•  lower interest rate 
spreads 
•  faster and more 
efficient capital 
allocation 
•  overall reduction of 
transaction costs 
 
Source: Eller et al., 2006.  32
Appendix 2. Key economic indicators of Estonia for 2005–2009* 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
GDP (EEK bn)  175.4 207.1 241.8 271.5  301.4 
Real GDP growth (%)  10.2 11.2 7.3 4.3  5.7 
HICP (%)  4.1 4.4 6.3 7.4  4.6 
GDP deflator growth (%)  6.1 6.2 8.8 7.7  5.1 
Current account (% of GDP)  –9.9 –15.5 –15.0 –11.8  –9.6 
Current account plus new capital 
account balance (% of GDP)  –8.9 –13.0 –12.9 –9.9 –7.8 
Real private consumption growth (%)  10.6 15.1 11.4 6.4  6.1 
Real government consumption growth 
(%)  1.6 2.6 4.1 2.2 2.6 
Real investment growth (%)  9.9 22.4 7.5 –1.6  1.8 
Real export growth (%)  20.5 8.3 5.2 5.3  7.1 
Real import growth (%)  16.3 17.1 5.0 3.9  5.3 
Unemployment rate (%)  7.9 5.9 5.2 5.8  6.2 
Change in the number of the employed 
(%)  2.0 6.4 1.3 –0.2 0.0 
Value added growth per full-time 
employee (%)  8.2 5.3 6.1 4.5 5.9 
Real wage growth (%)  8.5 11.9 15.1 8.8  5.0 
Average gross wage (%)  11.4 16.2 20.4 15.0  9.7 
Nominal money supply growth (%)  42.0 28.2 24.5 15.0  11.6 
Nominal credit growth (%)  50.4 51.6 28.5 15.6  12.0 
External debt (% of GDP)  85.3 96.4 107.5 108.9  108.4 
Budget balance (% of GDP)  2.3 3.7 2.8 1.1  0.7 
Source: Monetary Developments & Policy Survey 2007:8. 
* Forecast of Eesti Pank for years 2007–2009. 
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Appendix 3. Sponsoring principles of Hansapank 
 
We carry social responsibility  
 
Hansabank is a company that due to its size feels certain responsibility for the 
society. Our goal is to support Estonia`s development:  
•  we conduct our business activities so as to support Estonian economic growth 
and contribute to higher living standards with the means available to us  
•  we contribute to the debate about the development trends in the society  
•  we support the development of the society through sponsorship  
 
Vitality and innovation - the principles we support  
 
In our development strategy, we have prioritised vital and innovative development. 
Therefore, in our sponsoring activities, we prefer co-operation projects that are 
consistent, original and promote the development of the society.  
 
Education, culture, social sphere find more support  
 
Hansabank does not allocate money subjectively based on momentary impressions. 
We have firm preferences in the areas the society needs most. We support children, 
young people and education, big families, culture, and sports. 
 
Source: http://www.hansa.ee 
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Appendix 4. Hansabank’s key customers program 
Our key customers in 2007 have to 
fulfil the following criterions – to have a 
regular monthly income from 15,000 
kroons, received at the bank, or to start 
the collection of pension money in 
Hansabank and simultaneously to have a 
valid home loan agreement. 
 
  In token of our gratitude we have joined together 
conveniences, preferential prices and best offers 
from our partners into our key customer offer. 
Fast lane at the branch  It might seem a small thing, but you may be able 
to save time significantly during the rush hour. 
The key is your bank card, which you should 
insert in the machine when getting a queue 
ticket. 
1517  Our support and advice on banking services are 
available for the key customer round the clock. 
From abroad, dial +372 613 1517. 
Good conditions  Overdraft – the interest rate is 2% lower. Key 
customers get 50% discount when concluding the 
Unit-linked pension insurance, College Fund, 
Children Unit-linked Insurance and Hansa Fund 
Plan agreements. 
Special Offer  Every key customer can choose one of the 
following special offers: Intra-bank payments 
from internet bank free of charge; credit card 
premium account 50 points; Hansa Property 
insurance home insurance product for 1 year 
20% discount. 
Hansaleht  An in-depth overview of bank services and new 
directions direct to your door. 
Co-operation partners  Hansabank’s good co-operation partners also 
offer special conditions to the key customer. The 
offers which are renewed at least once a quarter 
are displayed on the offers page of internet bank. 
Source: http://www.hanza.net 
 